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200 | Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. However, “[tjhre... |
201 | L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Evans v. Techs. Apps. & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958-59 (4th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of showing the absence of a material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). A genuine issue of mater... |
202 | for summary judgment. See Ash v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 800 F.2d 409, 411-12 (4th Cir.1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when, after discovery, a party has failed to make a “showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden o... |
203 | it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.” Thompson v. Echols, No. 99-6304, 1999 WL 717280 (4th Cir.1999) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972)). While a court is not expected to develop tangential claims from scant assertions in a compla... |
204 | 8, 13.] Under Local Rule 7(J), and as indicated in Defendants’ proper Roseboro notice [Dkt. 10], Plaintiff had twenty-one days to file a response to the motion. See Local Rule 7(J); Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir.1975). As a result, the deadline to file an opposition was December 11, 2012. Plaintiff, howev... |
205 | Defendants due to sovereign immunity. (Def. Mem. at 10.) Unless waived, sovereign immunity protects the federal government and its agencies from suit and deprives a court of subject matter jurisdiction. See F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994); United States v. Jones, 225 F.3d 468... |
206 | and Fourteenth Amendment against the USPS in Counts I — III for both monetary and injunctive relief. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims for monetary relief under these counts should be dismissed because Plaintiff improperly attempts to use Section 1983 in Counts I-III. Section 1983 applies only to state act... |
207 | 157 L.Ed.2d 1122 (2004). Therefore, whether brought under Section 1983 or Bivens, Plaintiffs claims for monetary relief against the USPS under Count I — III must be dismissed. Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claims for injunctive relief under these counts should be dismissed for a number of independent reasons... |
208 | CSRA); Pinar v. Dole, 747 F.2d 899, 909 (4th Cir.1984). Plaintiff concedes that he was, at all times relevant, a postal service federal employee, but he does not allege that he is a preference eligible postal service employee who, accordingly, can access judicial review of the merits of an agency’s decision via Chapter... |
209 | exhaust his administrative remedies by filing his suit in federal court prematurely, a error that is not jurisdictional, or in the alternative, that the Court should dismiss the claims in Count IV for failure to state a claim. (Def. Mem. at 21-26.) The Court will resolve this count under Defendants’ first argument. Und... |
210 | the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Foreseeing this, Defendants therefore presented the argument against Counts IV-V via a motion for summary judgment included in the same document as their motion to dismiss. Based on the undisputed facts here, including the administrative and judicial record, and d... |
211 | his complaint, may file a civil action ... ”); 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407(b) (stating that a federal employee may file in district court “after 180 days from the date of filing an individual or class [administrative] complaint if an appeal has not been filed and final action has not been taken”). In this case, on May 12, 201... |
212 | amendment. Given Plaintiffs premature filing in federal court, the Court concludes that the undisputed facts indicate that Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies and therefore, the Court grants Defendants summary judgment on the claim in Count IV. 3. Title II Genetic Information Discrimination C... |
213 | of employment of the employee, because of genetic information with respect to the employee.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1(a)(1). The Act defines “genetic information” as (1) an individual’s genetic tests; (2) the genetic tests of the individual’s family members; (3) the manifestation of a disease or disorder of the individual’... |
214 | works” and that the NIH and USDE refuses to incorporate his genetic and religious theory on DNA into their testing and public education curriculum. Plaintiffs book and accompanying genetic and religious theory on DNA do not constitute “genetic information” under GINA. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state plausibl... |
215 | Kenneth Smith’s Motion for Reconsideration (the “Motion”). [Dkt. 23.] For the following reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiffs Motion. I. Background The facts of this case are recounted in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion dated January 8, 2013, familiarity with which is presumed. On July 13, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Comp... |
216 | Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act claim purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c(a). (Id. ¶ 30-54.) On November 30, 2012, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. [Dkts. 8, 13.] On January 8, 2013, this Court granted that motion, dismissing Counts I — III and V against all Defendants and gr... |
217 | Circuit has interpreted a motion for reconsideration as a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) where that motion has been filed within the specified time period. See Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s County Pub. Sch., 666 F.3d 244, 247 n. 4 (4th Cir.2012); Katyle v. Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 4... |
218 | F.3d 701, 708 (4th Cir.2002) (quoting Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir.1994)) (internal quotations omitted). A party’s mere disagreement with the court’s ruling does not warrant a Rule 59(e) motion, and such motions should not be used “to raise arguments which could have been raised prio... |
219 | Plaintiffs Complaint on Counts I — III and V and grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Count IV is unwarranted under Rule 59(e). Plaintiff has made no showing of (i) an intervening change in controlling law, (ii) new evidence that was not available to him previously, or (iii) a clear error of law or manif... |
220 | V against all Defendants for failure to state a claim for genétic information discrimination; and granted summary judgment to Defendants on Count IV because Plaintiff failed to timely exhaust his administrative remedies. In his Motion, Plaintiff simply disagrees with this Court’s dismissal of Counts I — III and V and g... |
221 | to read "May 21, 2012” given that the document refers to incidents occurring on dates after March (e.g. the alleged occurrence of discrimination in April 2012 and Plaintiff’s filing of his administrative complaint in May 2012). . In that earlier administrative complaint, Plaintiff alleged discrimination on the basis of... |
222 | MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’ [DKT. #31] MOTION TO DISMISS VANESSA L. BRYANT, District Judge. The Defendants, Lebanon Board of Education, (the “Board”) and the Superintended of the Board, Janet Tyler (“Tyler”), have moved to dismiss the Plaintiff Malcom Leichter, Jr. (“Leichter... |
223 | seq., violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-51 et seq. and for punitive damages. For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Procedural Background On August 8, 2012, the Plaintiff amended his complaint. See [... |
224 | that disability is not a protected class. See [Dkt. # 32, p. 15]. Plaintiff also consented to the withdrawal of that claim in his response as well. [Dkt. # 37, p. 21]. The Court therefore dismisses the Plaintiffs equal protection claim. After Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff moved to withdraw... |
225 | relevant part: Section I: Continuation of Contract and Salary Agreement This contract shall be renewed annually. For each year for which this contract is renewed, the annual salary of the Director of Business & Technology shall be established by mutual agreement between the Director of Business & Technology and the Boa... |
226 | Tyler began working for the Board on or about July 26, 2010. Id. at 1121. Plaintiff alleges that he “never had any issues with the prior three superintendents to whom he reported and all of Plaintiffs job performance evaluations were positive.” Id. Plaintiff further alleges that from the beginning of her tenure, Tyler ... |
227 | rehabilitation, and the restrictions placed upon him regarding the length of his work day by his cardiologist.” Id. He completed the rehabilitation program on December 22, 2010. Id. at ¶ 26. In December 2010, Tyler ordered Plaintiff to get a full release back to work because he was still limited to working no later tha... |
228 | leave work by six each night.” Id. at ¶ 30. On January 28, 2011, Plaintiff alleges he was called into Tyler’s office where he was “suspended without cause (purportedly placed on ‘administrative leave’) by Tyler.” Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges he was told by Tyler that the suspension “was not disciplinary, nor was Plai... |
229 | Plaintiff alleges that the email led staff members “to believe that the Plaintiff had done something morally, and/or ethically, and /or criminally wrong.” Id. In the email, Tyler wrote This communication is to inform district staff that Mai Leichter, the Director of Business and Technology, has been placed on administr... |
230 | positions; a business manager position and a technology manager position. Id. On February 16, 2011, the Board hired an outside contractor at an annualized cost of $124,800 per year to perform a part of the technology portion of Plaintiffs position. Id. at ¶ 35. On March 1, 2011, the Board hired a temporary part time bu... |
231 | Id. On April 1, 2011, the Board hired an outside contractor for $25,000 to complete a project closeout and report that was formerly Plaintiff’s responsibility. Id. at ¶39. On April 5, 2011, Tyler formally proposed to the Board that they divide the Plaintiffs position into two positions to redistribute the responsibilit... |
232 | of $78,900. Id. at ¶ 43. On September 1, 2011, the Board hired a part time consultant to perform the business manager portion of the Plaintiffs position. Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff alleges that the “Board has a practice and/or policy of discriminating against individuals with disabilities. Tyler has a history of discrimina... |
233 | Board terminated his employment without a hearing. Id. The Plaintiff also alleges that he had a protected liberty interest in his employment with the Board and that the Defendants “created and disseminated a false and defamatory impression about the Plaintiff in connection with his suspension and/or termination of his ... |
234 | 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). While Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’ Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of... |
235 | Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir.2010). “A court ‘can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50). “At the second step, a court should determine whether the ‘well-pleaded f... |
236 | Board had no discretion to decline to renew the agreement. [Dkt. # 37, Mem., p. 25-26]. In response to Plaintiffs argument, Defendants contend that if the agreement was for an indefinite duration, the employment relationship must necessarily be at-will in line with state law precedent which provides that “[a]s a genera... |
237 | intent, is a question of fact ... [w]here there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended by their contractual communications is a question of law.... subject to plenary review by this court.” Schwartz v. Family Dental Group, P.C., 106 Conn.App. 765, 771, 943 A.2d 1122 (2008) (inte... |
238 | 74, 922 A.2d 1100 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[Where] ... there is clear and definitive contract language, the scope and meaning of that language is not a question of fact but a question of law. When the language is clear and unambiguous, however, the contract is to be given effect accordin... |
239 | Supreme Court has recognized that the “use of the word ‘shall’ denotes that [a] directive in the contract ... was mandatory.” A. Dubreuil and Sons, Inc. v. Town of Lisbon, 215 Conn. 604, 610-11, 577 A.2d 709 (1990). The Connecticut Supreme Court explained that the “word ‘may,’ unless the context in which it is employed... |
240 | Board declined to renew the agreement are therefore without merit in light of the clear meaning of the terms of the agreement. Defendant next argues that if the agreement automatically renews it is a contract for an indefinite term and therefore creates an at-will employment relationship terminable for any reason. “In ... |
241 | 1, 15, 662 A.2d 89 (1995). Here, Defendants’ argument is premised on the default rule that contracts for indefinite employment are terminable at will. However, it is axiomatic that parties can contract out of the default rule and modify the agreement to provide a right to be terminated only for cause. Here, the clear t... |
242 | of contract after the foundation terminated her employment as executive director. The Solomon court concluded that the employment contract which called for continued employment until age 65 or retirement and which permitted the defendant to fire her only if she were adjudicated in a criminal court of competent jurisdic... |
243 | 526 (1966)). The Defendants argue that the Board of Education has similar management rights as corporate boards in Solomon citing to Conn. Gen.Stat. § 10-220. [Dkt. #42, Mem., p. 9]. The Defendants suggest that the Solomon court’s rationale counsels against interpreting the renewal provision as automatic thereby result... |
244 | a corporate board, the Court is not persuaded that such a parallel is appropriate. It is well established and common place for a board of education to employ individuals on a “lifetime basis” through teacher tenure. Further Connecticut courts have held that pursuant to Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 10-151 and 10-220 “[w]ide discr... |
245 | the overall supervision of the school system unlike the case of a corporate board in Solomon. Consequently, the rationale in Solomon does not counsel against inter preting the contract as automatically renewing terminable only for cause. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that the “for cause” termination provisi... |
246 | (Conn.Super.Ct. Nov. 15, 2001) (holding that there was a question of fact as to whether the defendant school’s decision to terminate teacher’s employment did not constitute good or sufficient cause as it was contrived and not the true reason for eliminating the teacher’s position). The question of whether the eliminati... |
247 | relationship without cause.” Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir.2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). A “property interest in employment may be the subject of a due process claim only if the plaintiff has a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” Etere v... |
248 | complaint with his or her supervisor then if necessary the superintendent. [Dkt. # 32, Mem., p. 18]. Then, if the employee is not satisfied with the disposition of the problem or complaint, the employee may submit a written statement to his supervisor within five days. The supervisor shall render a written decision and... |
249 | Educ., 323 F.3d 206, 213 (2d Cir.2003). Plaintiff argues that the policy was not applicable to his situation, that the policy did not provide for a pre-termination hearing which due process requires, and that once he was terminated he was no longer an employee with recourse to the procedures laid out in the policy. Pla... |
250 | complaint alone or convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 and afford all parties the opportunity to present supporting material.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). On the basis of the allegations of the amended complaint, the Plaintiff has plausibly stated that he has a pr... |
251 | Board to eliminate the Plaintiffs position to create two new positions. It is well established that a “person’s interest in his or her good reputation alone, apart from a more tangible interest, is not a liberty or property interest sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause or create a c... |
252 | question [the] plaintiffs good name, reputation, honor, or integrity. We have also said that statements that denigrate the employee’s competence as a professional and impugn the employee’s professional reputation in such a fashion as to effectively put a significant roadblock in that employee’s continued ability to pra... |
253 | too demanding to be performed well by a single person. The only statements to which the Plaintiff points are Tyler’s email informing staff that the Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave while district operations were reviewed and instructing staff to refrain from communicating with the Plaintiff while he was on ... |
254 | Id. at *5 (collecting authority). Moreover, the Plaintiff has not plausibly raised the falsity of these statements as; indeed the Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave to facilitate an independent review and Plaintiff does not contend that a review was conducted. Therefore, Tyler’s statement did not contain any ... |
255 | Board’s actions towards the Plaintiff are insufficient allegations of plus without stigma. Plaintiff argues in sum that the Board and Tyler’s conduct was tantamount to a subtle public campaign which imposed an actionable stigma in line with the Second Circuit’s decision in Quinn v. Syracuse Model Neigh. Corp., 613 F.2d... |
256 | criminal activity as was the case in Quinn. See Grunberg v. Board of Educ. For the City School Dist. Of the City of New York, No. cv-00-4124(DGT), 2006 WL 845389, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2006) (noting that in Quinn, the “defendants, through the media, made explicit accusations that the plaintiff engaged in criminal ac... |
257 | custom inflicts the injury. Because the Plaintiff has consented to withdrawing his equal protection claim and the Court has dismissed the Plaintiffs stigma-plus claim, the sole remaining Section 1983 claim is the Plain tiffs claim that he was denied due process when he was suspended and terminated without notice or hea... |
258 | to the protections of qualified immunity on Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims. When reviewing a claim of qualified immunity, a court must consider “whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged (See Fed. Rules Civ. Porc. 12(b)(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see Rule 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional [or statutory... |
259 | Court has provided district courts with the discretion to decide the order in which the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis are applied. Id. at 243, 129 S.Ct. 808. In providing the lower courts with the discretion to determine the order of qualified immunity analysis to be applied to a given case, the Supreme... |
260 | by qualified immunity.” Id. (quoting Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 345 (2d Cir.2011)). “Qualified immunity thus shields government officials from liability when they make ‘reasonable mistakes’ about the legality of their actions, and ‘applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of la... |
261 | from terminating (or not renewing) the employment relationship without cause.’” Taravella, 599 F.3d at 134 (quoting S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 967 (2d Cir.1988)). “It is also clear that the alleged property interest is constitutionally protected. [T]he state-law property interest of gov- eminent emp... |
262 | in the present case is not ambiguous but clearly provides that Plaintiff could not be terminated without cause and therefore it created a property interest protected by due process. Because the agreement was clear and unambiguous, Tyler’s action could not be objectively reasonable as a matter of law as was the case in ... |
263 | her to submit any questions she may have to human resources.” Id. at 221. The Second Circuit explained that “viewed in the light most favorable to Coollick, Hughes’s actions lie somewhere in the gray area in the spectrum of what satisfies due process given the particular facts of this case. Hughes sent Coollick reasona... |
264 | this is an issue which is best left to be raised in a motion for summary judgment. Whether Tyler’s actions were objectively reasonable in light of the Board’s complaint policy for non-unionized personnel is likewise a question best reserved for summary judgment. At this stage, the Court declines to find that qualified ... |
265 | CFEPA provides [an] exclusive remedy” and “preempts common-law causes of action,” Hall-Duncan v. Bruce Museum, Inc., No. FSTCV106004998, 2011 WL 590652, at *3 (Conn.Super.Ct., Jan. 24, 2011) (collecting cases). It appears that superior court judges are split with respect to this issue. Id. (citing cases). As Plaintiff ... |
266 | an at will employee may successfully challenge his dismissal beyond the situation where the reason for his discharge involves impropriety ... derived from some important violation of public policy.” Magnan v. Anaconda Indus., Inc., 193 Conn. 558, 572, 479 A.2d 781 (1984). Consequently, employees who are terminable at-w... |
267 | contract remedy for wrongful dismissal by an employer. The cases which have established a tort or contract remedy for employees discharged for reasons violative of public policy have relied upon the fact that in the context of their case the employee was otherwise without remedy and that permitting the discharge to go ... |
268 | 31-51m provides the exclusive remedy and precluded the plaintiff from pleading any alternative, common-law cause of action including breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Powell v. Greenwald Indus., Inc., No. CV095013578, 2010 WL 2383784, at *5 (Conn.Super.Ct. April 29, 2010) (concluding on the basis of t... |
269 | in CFEPA must be precluded as Plaintiff has failed to establish that CFEPA does not afford an adequate remedy to address the public policy violation. As the Powell court concluded, because the Plaintiffs implied covenant claim is expressly based on a violation of the public policy embodied in CFEPA, CFEPA provides the ... |
270 | grants Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. vii. Punitive Damages Defendants argue that Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages against the Board should be dismissed. As the Court has dismissed the Plaintiffs Section 1983 claims against the Board and Tyler ... |
271 | penalized for the acts of its agents over which it is able to exercise but little direct control.” City of Hartford v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 760, 49 Conn. App. 805, 717 A.2d 258, 266 (1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The parties have failed to substantively brief whether punitive dam... |
272 | MEMORANDUM AND ORDER JULIE A. ROBINSON, District Judge. Plaintiff American Civil Liberties Union of Kansas and Western Missouri brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for redress of alleged violations of its members’ constitutional rights by Defendant Sally Praeger’s enforcement of Kansas House Bill 2075, cod... |
273 | summary judgment on its claim that the statute has the unconstitutional effect of imposing a substantial obstacle to obtaining abortions. On July 6, 2012, Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment (Doc. 65), arguing that the Act does not have the predominant purpose of imposing a substantial obstacle to obtai... |
274 | construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” A fact is “material” if, under the applicable substantive law, it is “essential to the proper disposition of the claim.” An issue of fact is “genuine” if “ ‘the evidence is such ... |
275 | may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Rather, the nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant.” To accomplish this, the facts “must be identified by reference to an affi... |
276 | determination of every action.” In responding to a motion for summary judgment, “a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.” II. Uncontroverted Facts Many of the relevant facts in this case are not... |
277 | no exceptions for the health of the mother, for a nonviable fetus, or for pregnancies that result from rape or incest. Insurance companies may only provide coverage for these and other elective abortions in a separate rider, which must fully cover the cost of elective abortions per enrollee as determined on an average ... |
278 | to pay for an abortion. As the pregnancy advances, the cost of an abortion increases, and the procedure carries more risks. Prior to the Act’s passage, insurance companies comprising over 70% of the insurance market share in Kansas included abortion coverage in their comprehensive policies. But after the Act’s passage,... |
279 | knows she needs an abortion to buy it. Rather, she must buy the rider prior to becoming pregnant, because companies generally impose a long waiting period between the time the rider was purchased and when it can be used to cover an abortion. The insurance companies do not anticipate that many, if any, riders will be so... |
280 | In a similar time span (July 2010 to July 2011), the three major health insurers in Kansas with a combined total of over 70% of the market share had a total of 137 paid claims for abortions (not including treatment for ectopic pregnancy and miscarriage management, and not including claims in self-insured plans). The Ac... |
281 | expected effects on premium prices. The Act has not caused abortion providers to change the amount they charge for performing an abortion, although the out-of-pocket costs for women seeking abortions no longer covered by insurance will be higher. Some women seeking treatment have been turned away because they are unabl... |
282 | it without undue interference from the State,” and “the principle that the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.” Casey recognizes the right of a woman to have an abortion before viability, but this is not... |
283 | if either its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking to abort a nonviable fetus.” This creates a two part test, with the first part focused on the law’s purpose and the second part focused on the law’s actual effect. In determining whether a statute’s purpose is proper, the ... |
284 | Purpose Prong Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence that the Legislature’s predominant motivation in passing the Act was only to make abortions more difficult to secure, and this failure is fatal to its motion for summary judgment. In its first argument, Plaintiff notes that House Bill 2075 passed during the sam... |
285 | state law concerning abortion invalid. Casey observed that a statute which, “while furthering the interest in potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice” cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends. Case... |
286 | such that the Act serves no legitimate state interest. But in this argument, Plaintiff again misconceives the nature of its burden. The Court cannot assume unconstitutional legislative intent just because an Act lacks an obvious, constitutionally legitimate intent, and so Plaintiff must produce some evidence suggesting... |
287 | law. For example, the state may enact a measure designed to encourage births that does not further a health interest, if it is a persuasive, not merely a restrictive, measure. And a law that serves an educational role or that otherwise serves a legitimate state interest is not invalid merely because it impacts abortion... |
288 | interest, Plaintiff notes that premiums for abortion riders are pooled with all other premiums to pay abortion claims, so in one sense this legislation is an accounting sleight of hand, giving the illusion that the abortion funds are separate. Plaintiff also notes that pri- or to the Act’s passage, an employer could al... |
289 | plans that do not cover abortions. Second, although, as Plaintiff indicates, the Act does not significantly lower insurance rates for individuals, the Act will likely lower insurance costs in the aggregate, particularly for businesses employing large numbers of people. And third, the Act could make individuals seeking ... |
290 | not attempted in this motion to put on evidence to establish such an effect, and the court expresses no opinion here on that question. Insofar as the purpose of the law is concerned, the likely effect of it is not so self-evident that it must be said to manifest a legislative intent to obstruct the right to abortion. I... |
291 | granted, and Plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment on the same issue is denied. B. Effect of the Act Defendant also seeks summary judgment on the question of whether the Act has the effect of imposing a substantial obstacle on a woman’s right to an abortion. As a general matter, a law is deemed unconstitutional ... |
292 | is now only available in a separate rider. Purchasing the rider will prove difficult or impossible for many women. From July 2010 to July 2011, the three major health insurers in Kansas with a combined total of over 70% of the market share had a total of 137 paid claims for abortions, and there is no reason to believe ... |
293 | cases addressing government funding for births and abortions. Defendant relies on the Supreme Court’s statement in Harris v. McRae that “it simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected choi... |
294 | a difference between those two factors in cases involving state funding of abortion, owing to the state’s role in providing funds for healthcare in those cases, here it is a distinction without a difference. The state has imposed a restriction on a private funding mechanism for abortion by preventing many women from co... |
295 | abortion while gathering the necessary funds to pay for an abortion; with insurance that covered the abortion, they would not face these significant challenges. The undisputed facts on this issue, construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, create a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether th... |
296 | in the large-fraction equation. If the denominator casts a wide net, it becomes significantly more difficult to show that the statute substantially burdens a large fraction of those included in the denominator. Here, Defendant urges the Court to consider the number of cases in which the statute is relevant as the total... |
297 | guidance on choosing a denominator in Casey. In assessing a spousal-notification requirement for abortions, the Casey court took as its denominator the less than one percent of women who were “married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of ... |
298 | included in Casey, then the entire population of Kansas cannot be included here. Further, the pool of women who had insurance coverage for abortions but have now lost it is still too broad, given that the Casey Court only included those women seeking an abortion. And, following that reasoning, the denominator cannot in... |
299 | of 140 women. These women now have to pay for their abortion, should they choose to have one, directly, and not with insurance funds. Absent more evidence, it is difficult to determine whether this burden is an undue one for a large fraction of these women, but the significant additional costs, considered in the light ... |
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